Greg Detre
Thursday, 19 April, 2001
Jeremy Watkins, Hertford
Ethics II
Hume formulated a prototypical emotivism with his customary iconoclasm, contesting the assumption that reason could derive and justify our moral system. He attacked reason as a basis for morality on a number of grounds. He considered reason to function as a means of assessing: relations between ideas; and the causal process. Relations between ideas can be true or false, but do not align with the value distinctions of morality. In a way, this anticipates his later �is/ought� distinction. Causes and effects (or in the wider sense, �matters of fact�, as Locke would term it) are similarly uncorrelated with morality. Hume proceeds to demolish Wollaston�s conception that immorality stems from a confusion of reason or judgement in a footnote, leaving little room in his eyes for reason to influence morality.
However, emotivism�s most famous proponent was Alfred Ayer, when he crafted it to fit with his logical positivism, in �Language, truth and logic�. Logical positivism, briefly, is the position that all literally meaningful propositions were either analytic (i.e. true or false purely in virtue of the meanings of the words used to make it and the grammatical rules governing their combination; or alternatively, judgements whose denial yielded a contradiction), or derived directly empirically (verifiably, and through the senses). Following the Vienna Circle, Ayer employed it in his denials of God, metaphysics and causation.
Traditional ethical notions about the moral �rightness� or �wrongness� of an action are similarly insubstantial to a logical positivist. When I say that �Stealing is wrong�, the moral sentiments expressed are not contained or inherent in the concept of �stealing�, and nor is the wrongness of stealing empirically verifiable in any way. Ayer posited that the statement, �Stealing is wrong�, amounts to little more than saying �Stealing!!!� in an outraged tone. In other words, I am supplementing the concept with my associated emotional response, but not adding anything to the meaning of the sentence itself. Talk of emotions themselves, such as outrage, anger, pleasure or desire, is presumably meaningful, since they are both analytic (it is a contradiction to deny the statement, �I am angry�, when I am in fact angry) and empirically verifiable (as behaviourism demonstrated).
Confusingly, when I do consider an act, such as stealing, and give voice to the emotions I feel, according to Ayer I am not even saying anything about my own mind: �I am merely expressing certain moral sentiments�. If another man contradicts me, he too is expressing his moral sentiments. Neither of us is right, since neither of us has formed a �genuine proposition�, in the same way that neither a cry of pain nor a smile are genuine propositions admitting truth or falsity.
Rather, an ethical statement comprises the feeling it expresses, and the reaction it is designed to provoke, ranging from the imperative of �duty�, through the emphasis of �ought�, to the weaker suggestiveness of �good�. Ayer considered the distinction to lie between the expression and assertion of feeling. I can express my feelings (e.g. boredom) in my tone of voice, while asserting my excitement. Usually though, the two tally, which leads to the confusion.
Emotivism is extremely appealing in certain ways. Notably, it provides an immediate understanding of how motivation follows from moral judgement, as it surely does in our behaviour. When I vent my heartfelt anger and moral indignation at thievery, it is highly unlikely that I will go out and steal a car or even a loaf of bread the next day, except perhaps under exceptional circumstances. Rather than requiring an intermediary pairing of reasons and desires, emotivism directly justifies how moral motivation determines judgement.
Emotivism flies in the face of the efforts of most moral systems. In a way, this gulf transcends even meta-ethics, and the blame for the schism lies with metaphysics and reason. Upstanding moral philosophers have tended to be upstanding rationalists, and it is obvious why. Morality, with its firm, unyielding values of right and wrong appeals to the same mindset as does reason, with its firm, unyielding values of truth and falsehood. To deny the Absolute in one undermines the Absolute in the other. This is not a hard and fast rule. Indeed, many philosophers (e.g. Williams), have accepted that even if we could know Absolute Truth, no Absolute Ethics would ensue, since the way we should live our lives is so bound up with who we are as a species and culture, and what we value as a result.
However, emotivism is intended to be distinguishable from �orthodox subjectivism�. Both would attack the notion of objective moral standards, against which we should measure our own. The crucial difference lies in the nature of the ethical notions which the two theories employ. Subjectivists and objectivists agree more or less about the nature of an ethical statement � it is a sentiment attached to an action which determines whether it is morally right or wrong. They differ about the scope within which such moral sentiments can be judged correct. Objectivists believe that we should all follow and agree with the same objective moral sentiments, while subjectivists believe that we should and can only each hold our own moral opinions. Emotivists would deny that such moral opinions can really exists in this form. Rather, we each merely shout �Boo� or �Hurray� in accordance with our emotions in reaction. This leaves little room for sustained ethical enquiry. At the very least though, emotivism demonstrates how difficult it is to explain the necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation, and forces us to consider what role reason plays in defining the fundamental emotions and feelings underlying our values.